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Thinking Outside the Body: An Advantage for Spatial Updating During
Imagined Versus Physical Self-Rotation
Maryjane Wraga
Smith College
Three studies examined effects of different response measures on spatial updating during self-rotation.
In Experiment 1, participants located objects in an array with a pointer after physical self-rotation,
imagined self-rotation, and a rotation condition in which they ignored superfluous sensorimotor signals.
In line with previous research, updating performance was found to be superior in the physical selfrotation condition compared with the other 2. In Experiment 2, participants performed in identical
movement conditions but located objects by verbal labeling rather than pointing. Within the verbal
modality, an advantage for updating during imagined self-rotation was found. In Experiment 3, participants performed physical and imagined self-rotations only and used a pointing response offset from their
physical reference frames. Performance was again superior during imagined self-rotations. The results
suggest that it is not language processing per se that improves updating performance but rather a general
reduction of the conflict between physical and projected egocentric reference frames.

physical laws under some circumstances (Creem, Wraga, & Proffitt, 2001; Wraga, 1998). What might account for such inconsistencies in spatial updating during imagined self-rotation? Although
many metholological differences exist across studies, one trend is
clear. In all studies in which updating performance was relatively
poor, participants used a pointing response (e.g., Easton & Sholl,
1995; Farrell & Robertson, 1998; Klatzky et al., 1998; Presson &
Montello, 1994; Rieser, 1989). In all studies in which performance
was relatively good, participants used a verbal response (e.g.,
Creem, Wraga, & Proffitt, 2001; Wraga, 1998; Wraga et al., 2000;
Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2002). Recent research suggests
that pointing- and verbal-response measures may affect spatialupdating performance in different ways during imagined and physical self-movement (de Vega & Rodrigo, 2001). The present
studies were designed to investigate this issue further.
It is difficult to resist the logic that sensorimotor information
accounts for enhanced updating performance during selfmovement. This idea is backed by many empirical studies (e.g.,
Farrell & Robertson, 1998; Klatzky et al., 1998; Presson & Montello, 1994; Rieser, 1989; Rieser, Garing, & Young, 1994; Rieser,
Guth, & Hill, 1986). For example, Rieser (1989) found that blindfolded participants’ ability to point to an object from a novel
perspective was more accurate when they were physically rotated
to the new perspective rather than when they simply imagined
rotating to it. Pointing response times (RTs) in the imagined
condition also increased with angular disparity, whereas RTs during physical movement were independent of the angular distance
traversed. These findings suggest that participants in the imagined
condition had relied on a cognitively effortful process such as
mental rotation to realign the egocentric frame of the physical
body with the projected egocentric frame corresponding to the new
viewpoint. In contrast, updating during physical movement appeared to be “automatic,” in that reference-frame alignment occurred in tandem with movement and required little or no additional cognitive effort (e.g., Farrell & Robertson, 1998; Presson,
1987). Rieser and others have posited that the continuous align-

To keep track of an observer’s location during self-movement,
the human cognitive system must continuously update spatial
information with respect to the environment and the body. The
former case involves the environmental reference frame, which
encodes spatial information with respect to the cardinal directions;
the latter involves the egocentric reference frame, which encodes
an object’s position and orientation with respect to the coordinate
system of the body. Researchers have proposed that spatial updating during self-movement is accomplished through continual
alignment of the egocentric reference frame with the observer’s
current heading (e.g., Farrell & Robertson, 1998; Klatzky, Loomis,
Beall, Chance, & Golledge, 1998). The precise mechanism underlying this alignment process is unclear, but it is thought that
sensorimotor information such as vestibular and proprioceptive
signals available during physical self-movement play a crucial
role. Indeed, when these signals are absent, such as when an
observer merely imagines rotating to a new viewpoint rather than
physically rotating to it, spatial updating becomes relatively slow
and cognitively effortful (e.g., Easton & Sholl, 1995; Farrell &
Robertson, 1998; Klatzky et al., 1998; Presson & Montello, 1994;
Rieser, 1989). However, such findings do not represent all
imagined-self-rotation performance. A growing number of studies
have shown spatial updating during imagined self-rotation to be
relatively quick and effortless (e.g., Wraga, Creem, & Proffitt,
2000; Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2002) and even to defy
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ment of an observer’s egocentric reference frame with his or her
current heading during physical movement is due to contributions
of concurrent sensorimotor signals (Farrell & Robertson, 1998;
Rieser, 1989). The automatic-updating hypothesis provides a default mechanism in which observers are always primarily oriented
to their physical heading (e.g., Presson, 1987).
Farrell and Robertson (1998) provided a further characterization
of the automaticity effect. They examined spatial updating and
self-rotation within several contexts. In their updating condition,
blindfolded participants used a pointer to locate objects in an array
after rotating to a new position in the array; in the imagination
condition, they updated object locations after imagining rotating to
a new position in the array. In line with Rieser (1989), performance was expected to be superior in the updating condition
compared with the imagined condition. The critical task was the
ignoring condition, in which participants physically moved themselves to a new position in the array but then located objects as if
from their initial starting point. Farrell and Robertson reasoned that
if sensorimotor information available during physical movement
rendered updating automatic in the sense that it was not under
participants’ volitional control, then performance in the ignoring
condition would be akin to an imagination-only condition. In other
words, participants in the ignoring condition would be obliged to
mentally rotate the egocentric reference frame from their new view
back to the initial starting point. The results bore out the authors’
predictions. Participants’ pointing responses were slower and less
accurate in the imagination and ignoring conditions compared with
a control. Moreover, response rates in both conditions increased as
a function of rotation magnitude. In contrast, no difference in
performance was found between updating and control conditions,
and updating RTs showed only a weak rotation magnitude effect.
These findings notwithstanding, it is important to note that
additional sources of sensorimotor information do not always
result in enhanced spatial updating. For example, several recent
studies have shown that efference copies of motor commands,
available during active movement, do not improve updating performance compared with updating during passive movement,
when such information is absent (e.g., Wang & Simons, 1999;
Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2002; Yardley & Higgins,
1998). Wang and Simons (1999) found that participants who were
passively rotated by the experimenter to a new view about an
unseen array were as accurate at updating object locations as those
who had actively rotated themselves. Yardley and Higgins (1998)
found a similar result for a task in which participants reported
which number they would face after passive rotation or active
rotation of their bodies about the center of a large clock. Yardley
and Higgins found performance to be equivalent across both types
of movement for rotations in one direction. An updating advantage
for active movement emerged only when the active–passive movement sequence consisted of a continuous series of two or three
counterdirectional rotations.
There is also some evidence that updating during imagined
self-rotation can be automatic. Much of this work has directly
compared updating during imagined self-rotations about an array
with imagined rotations of the array itself (e.g., Amorim & Stucchi, 1997; Huttenlocher & Presson, 1979; Presson, 1982; Wraga et
al., 2000; Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2002). In these experiments, participants typically perform one or the other imagined
rotation and then update the location of a given object in an array

by verbally reporting its location (e.g., “right” or “left”). The
results have consistently shown that updating performance is faster
and more accurate during imagined rotations of the observer than
of the array. This advantage persists regardless of whether the
observer is immersed within the array or is separate from it (Wraga
et al., 2000) or whether the array is replaced by a single object
depicting a novel or highly overlearned configuration (Amorim &
Stucchi, 1997; Huttenlocher & Presson, 1979; Wraga et al., 2000).
Some studies have found a flat rotation function for imagined
self-rotations beyond 0° that is consistent with automatic updating
(Wraga et al., 2000; Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2002).
Moreover, some studies have shown that updating during imagined self-rotation may transcend physical laws (Creem, Wraga, &
Proffitt, 2001; Wraga, 1998). For example, Creem, Wraga, and
Proffitt (2001) found that updating performance during imagined
self-rotation about an array was not affected when the array
appeared in a physically impossible position (e.g., parallel to the
wall). Nor was performance affected when participants’ bodies
were in a position prohibitive to physical self-movement (e.g.,
lying supine on the ground). The critical factor to maintaining
relatively fast and accurate updating performance during imagined
self-rotation was preservation of the orthogonal relationship between the array and the projected egocentric reference frame. In
instances where this relationship was violated, such as when the
plane of rotation was parallel to the participant’s egocentric frame
(e.g., an imagined cartwheel movement around four objects), updating performance dropped to that of imagined array rotations.
These results collectively suggest that updating during imagined
self-rotation may be more flexible than previously assumed.
Wraga and colleagues have argued that the flexibility may be due
to the ease in which the human cognitive system transforms the
egocentric reference frame, independent of sensorimotor signals
(Wraga et al., 2000).
How can one reconcile the seemingly disparate spatial-updating
performance found in the studies described previously? Recent
research indicates that the use of different response measures may
hold the answer. In a series of studies designed to explore the
relationship between language and spatial representation, de Vega
and Rodrigo (2001) found that pointing- and verbal-response measures may affect spatial updating differently. In their first experiment, participants formulated a spatial configuration from a verbal
description of a scene. They then either physically rotated themselves to a new position in the configuration or merely imagined
rotating to a new position and then updated object locations by
using computer arrow keys. Similar to Farrell and Robertson
(1998) and Rieser (1989), participants were faster and more accurate at updating during physical rotation than during imagined
rotation. In the second experiment, participants performed the
same task in identical movement conditions but used verbal labels
to update object locations. Within the verbal modality, de Vega
and Rodrigo found similar updating performance across physical
and imagined rotations. That is, the classic updating decrement
found during imagined self-rotation with a pointing response disappeared when participants responded with verbal labels instead.
de Vega and Rodrigo concluded that the differential pointing and
verbal-labeling results indicated the presence of two separate updating mechanisms, associated with spatial and language processing, respectively. According to de Vega and Rodrigo’s view,
pointing is a type of first-order updating, which occurs during

UPDATING ADVANTAGE DURING IMAGINED SELF-ROTATION

physical movement and relies strongly on sensorimotor information. In contrast, verbal labeling elicits a type of second-order
updating, which is purely representational and can be independent
of the physical body.

Overview of the Experiments
We concur with de Vega and Rodrigo’s (2001) characterization
of separate updating mechanisms for pointing versus verbal responses; however, we suspected that the distinction underlying
differences in performance occurs at a more general level than that
of language versus spatial processing. In particular, we hypothesized that observers have difficulties updating object locations
during imagined self-rotation when required to use a pointing
response because traditional pointing response measures unnaturally anchor observers to their physical body. This anchoring effect
tends to emphasize the spatial conflict between the egocentric
reference frame of the physical body and the projected frame of the
new viewpoint. The conflict thus interferes with observers’ ability
to move mentally to the location of the projected egocentric frame
during imagined self-rotation. On the other hand, response measures such as verbal labels reduce the spatial conflict between the
physical and projected egocentric frames, most likely because
verbal responses are less dependent on the framework of the
physical body. Thus, verbal responses allow observers to move
mentally to the projected egocentric reference frame more readily.
According to this view, spatial-updating performance is mediated
by the presence or absence of reference-frame conflicts at the
storage and/or output level, rather than on verbal versus spatial
encoding per se.
In the present studies we tested the reference-frame-conflict
hypothesis by varying the response measures used in a novel
spatial-updating task, which participants performed under conditions of physical, imagined, and ignored self-rotation. The updating task was based on Farrell and Robertson’s (1998) paradigm,
with several notable changes. One potential problem of their
design was that the duration of the RT event differed across
experimental conditions. In their updating (physical-movement)
condition, the RT event began after the participant had completed
rotating: It included only the time to locate the object. However, in
their imagined and ignoring conditions, the RT event included time
to rotate and time to locate a given object. Given that one indication of updating automaticity is a flat RT rotation function, it is
possible that inclusion of time-to-rotate in the imagined and ignoring RT events might have artificially inflated RTs in those
conditions with increasing rotation magnitude, compared with the
updating condition. Thus, automaticity effects in those conditions
may have been concealed. To control for this possibility, we
divided the entire spatial-updating event into rotation and location
components, each of which was separately timed (following
Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2002). Participants first were
given the location of a target to rotate to within an array; once they
had arrived at the new view, they then located another object in the
array from that location. This technique rendered all movement
conditions equivalent with respect to the critical location component of the task. It also eliminated the need for a control condition:
Performance in the location component could be directly compared across movement conditions.
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Other differences in our paradigm involved the makeup of the
arrays and the range of trials tested. Farrell and Robertson’s (1998)
array contained seven objects separated at increments of 51.5°, and
their trials included only a subset of possible rotation–location
pairings. In the present experiment we used a six-object array with
60° increments because this arrangement was more adaptable to
changes in response measures. We also paired all possible rotations of the array with all possible object locations (with the
exception of 0° location) in order to test a broader range of trials.
We conducted three experiments on the reference-frameconflict hypothesis using the novel updating task. Experiment 1
was designed to replicate Farrell and Robertson’s (1998) finding of
enhanced updating performance during physical self-rotation. We
compared participants’ updating performance during physical selfrotation, imagined self-rotation, and a rotation condition in which
participants had to ignore superfluous sensorimotor signals. In all
movement conditions, judgments were made using a pointing
response. In line with Farrell and Robertson, we found performance in the physical-self-rotation task to be superior to that of the
other conditions. In Experiment 2 we introduced a response measure designed to reduce the conflict between physical and projected egocentric reference frames. We used the same updating
task and movement conditions as in Experiment 1, but participants
responded by verbally locating objects rather than pointing to
them. Similar to de Vega and Rodrigo (2001), we found an
advantage for updating during imagined self-rotation using the
verbal context. The third experiment demonstrated that verbal
encoding was not the critical factor to improved updating. We
tested performance during physical and imagined self-rotation
only, using a pointing response that was designed to reduce participants’ reliance on the coordinate systems of their bodies. Participants responded by pressing keys on a computer keyboard that
contained spatial indicators offset from the egocentric frame of the
physical body. Performance was again found to be superior in the
imagined-self-rotation condition, indicating that it is not verbal
encoding per se that improves performance, but rather a more
general reduction of reference-frame conflicts.

Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to replicate Farrell and Robertson’s
(1998) finding of superior updating performance during physical
self-rotation, using a novel spatial-updating task. In the present
experiment participants sat in a rotating chair in the center of a
six-object array and used a pointer to locate the positions of unseen
objects from novel perspectives. Participants’ movement to the
novel perspectives was dictated by the supposed movements of a
cartoon character, Gumby. For each trial, participants heard a
target location where Gumby had “traveled” to in the array (e.g.,
“Gumby is in blue”). After turning to face the target location
(hereafter referred to as the Gumby color), participants then heard
a second color and were required to locate it from their perspective
facing the Gumby color. We tested three types of movement to the
Gumby color. In the aligned condition, the experimenter physically rotated participants to the Gumby color; thus, participants’
projected egocentric frame was aligned with the physical egocentric frame for the location component of the task (see Figure 1A).
The aligned condition is similar to Farrell and Robertson’s updating condition, except that participants’ movement was passive
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Figure 1. Overhead view of the array configuration used in Experiments 1–3, illustrating the relationship
between physical (dark arrow) and projected (light arrow) egocentric reference frames in the three movement
conditions during the location component of a hypothetical trial. A: In the aligned condition, the participant is
turned to the Gumby color (P); his or her physical and projected reference frames are aligned with respect to B,
the color to be located. B: In the misaligned condition, the participant is turned to a color other than P but updates
B as if facing P; his or her physical and projected egocentric frames are misaligned. C: In the imagined condition,
the participant imagines turning to P; his or her physical and projected reference frames are misaligned.

rather than active. We did not expect this to be problematic, as
previous research has found no difference in updating performance
for passive self-rotation and active self-rotation (e.g., Wang &
Simons, 1999; Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2002). In the
misaligned condition, participants were instructed to imagine rotating themselves to the Gumby color while the experimenter
rotated them to another color; participants then located objects
with respect to the Gumby color. Thus, a participant’s projected
egocentric frame was misaligned from that of his or her physical
body for the location component of the task (see Figure 1B). The
misaligned condition is similar to Farrell and Robertson’s ignoring
condition, in that participants were required to ignore sensorimotor
signals received during movement to an incorrect location. In the
imagined condition, participants mentally rotated themselves to the
Gumby color; thus, their projected egocentric frames were again
misaligned from those of their physical bodies during the location
component (see Figure 1C). In all conditions, the location component of the task (i.e., location of the second color) was most
critical to the analysis. In line with Farrell and Robertson, we
predicted that updating performance would be superior in the
aligned condition compared with the imagined and misaligned
conditions.

Method
Participants
Nineteen Harvard University undergraduate students (10 women and 9
men) volunteered to participate in the experiment. All were right-handed.
They were compensated $10 for their time. None of the participants knew
of the hypothesis being tested.

Materials
Six wooden stands, 95 cm in height, were positioned to form a 183-cm
diameter hexagonal array. Each stand was comprised of two 15 ⫻ 15 ⫻ 2

cm (Length ⫻ Width ⫻ Height) wooden squares, attached together with a
91-cm long, 2-cm diameter wooden dowel. Onto the center of each stand
was placed a 5 ⫻ 24 cm piece of colored felt (red, purple, blue, white, gray,
and yellow). For the pointer, we affixed a 0.5-cm diameter, 22-cm long
black dowel with pointed tip to a 25 cm ⫻ 61 cm ⫻ 1 cm wooden board,
painted white. The center of the dowel was attached to the board with a nail
and several washers, which raised it 0.5 cm from the board. We attached
a 1.5-cm high wooden peg to the top of the board a few degrees left of the
0° pointer position. This measure ensured that the pointer was aligned with
the 0° position and that it could be turned in only a clockwise direction. To
record pointing responses during the test trials, we inserted a 24-cm2
diameter photo-reproduced compass, accurate to minutes of degree, on the
board underneath the pointer. We created the experiment using PsyScope
software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993), run on a Macintosh G3 laptop. PsyScope controlled the auditory stimulus presentation and
recorded RTs and errors.

Procedure
Participants first learned how to use the pointer. They were seated in a
swivel chair centered within the array, which initially did not contain any
color squares. The experimenter then placed the pointer (without the
compass) onto the arms of the chair so that it was directly in front of the
participant. Participants were instructed to turn the pointer using their
dominant hand in a clockwise direction only. They were then given as
much time as necessary to learn to use the pointer to locate the six array
locations. The experimenter then tested them for the array locations.
Participants closed their eyes, and the experimenter positioned the compass
onto the pointer. The experimenter then tapped on each of the stands of the
array, in a random order. Participants were instructed to point to each stand
as quickly and as accurately as possible. They received verbal feedback on
responses that were displaced off the target by amounts greater than ⫾ 10°
(e.g., “The target is actually more to your right or left”). Criteria for
learning were met when participants could locate each stand within 5 s at
an accuracy of ⫾ 10°. Once participants had learned to use the pointer, the
experimenter removed the compass. Participants opened their eyes, and the
experimenter placed the colored felt pieces of a given array configuration
on the stands. Participants then learned the configuration of colors. They
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were given as much time as necessary to memorize the color locations and
to practice locating them with the pointer (most participants took about 5
min). After memorization, participants closed their eyes and the experimenter placed the compass onto the pointer. The experimenter then tested
for the color locations by calling them out in a random order. The same
criteria for learning to use the pointer were used in the array-configuration
training. After training, the experimenter removed the compass for the
rotation and location components of the task. The instructions were altered
depending on the movement condition as follows.
Rotation component. For each trial, participants first heard a Gumby
color (e.g., “Gumby is in red”). In the aligned condition, participants were
asked to imagine turning clockwise in place on the chair to face the Gumby
color and were informed that the experimenter would also physically turn
them clockwise to the Gumby color. Immediately after the Gumby color
was heard, the experimenter turned the participant in his or her chair to the
correct location in the array. The experimenter said “stop” to indicate that
participants had arrived at the Gumby color. In the misaligned condition,
participants were asked to imagine turning clockwise in place on the chair
to face the Gumby color and were informed that the experimenter would be
turning them clockwise to a color other than the Gumby color. Once the
Gumby color was heard, the experimenter turned the participant to a
previously determined color, which was located either one or two colors
before the Gumby color or one or two colors after the Gumby color (order
of occurrence was randomized). The experimenter said “stop” to indicate
that participants had arrived at the non-Gumby location. In the imagined
condition, participants were asked to imagine turning clockwise in place on
the chair to face the Gumby color. They were instructed to say “stop” aloud
when they had arrived at the color in their imagination. Response latency
(measured from the end of the presentation of the Gumby color to the onset
of a “stop” response) was recorded using the computer’s timer, which the
experimenter controlled. She pressed the computer mouse to initiate and
end the timed event.
Location component. Once participants had “arrived” at the Gumby
color in each movement condition, they heard a second color (e.g., “blue”).
Their task was to locate this color from their new perspective by pointing
to it as quickly and accurately as possible. When they were confident in the
position of the pointer, participants said “okay.” The computer controlled
presentation of the second color: It was delivered 100 ms after the end of
the rotation event. Response latency for the location component was
measured from the end of the presentation of the second color to the onset
of an “okay” response, which the experimenter controlled by pressing the
computer mouse.
Once participants understood the instructions, they put on a blindfold.
They performed a practice trial that acclimated them to the auditory cues
of the computer; it also ensured that they understood the task. They then
performed the test trials. For each trial, the experimenter recorded RTs for
turning and location components of the task as described previously. The
experimenter recorded the magnitude of pointing responses separately on a
sheet of paper and later entered these values into the computer. At the end
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of each condition, participants were allowed to remove the blindfold and
take a short break. The experimenter then created the next array configuration and began training and instructions for the next condition.

Design
Participants performed in all movement conditions (aligned, imagined,
and misaligned). We created three array configurations based on the
following criteria: Across arrays, no color appeared at the same location,
and no two of the same colors were adjacent to each other. Each of the six
rotations of the array (0°, 60°, 120°, 180°, 240°, 300°) was matched with
five locations (60°, 120°, 180°, 240°, 300°; with 0° excluded) for a total
of 30 trials per condition. The Gumby target “appeared” randomly at the
six rotation positions, and the location colors were also randomized. Orders
of condition and array configurations were counterbalanced across
participants.

Analyses
We recorded pointing responses and RTs for each condition. For analysis, we computed mean unsigned error by taking the absolute value of the
difference between participant’s pointing response for a given trial and the
canonical value for that trial. For the RT data, RTs greater than 2.5 times
the condition means were trimmed; they were replaced with the condition
means (⬍2% of the data). We performed a 6 (order of condition) ⫻ 3
(movement condition) ⫻ 6 (rotation magnitude) mixed design analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on the mean unsigned error and RTs.

Results
Rotation RT
Table 1 shows mean RTs and standard errors for rotation in the
aligned, misaligned, and imagined conditions. Because the method
of rotation differed among movement conditions (e.g., passive
physical vs. active imagined rotation), we did not perform parametric tests on these data.

Location Accuracy
Figure 2 shows mean unsigned error and standard errors for
each movement condition as a function of rotation magnitude. The
principal finding was that updating performance was more accurate in the aligned condition (M ⫽ 13.66°) than in the misaligned
(M ⫽ 7.27°) and imagined (M ⫽ 22.12°) conditions. The ANOVA
performed on mean scores yielded a main effect of condition, F(2,
26) ⫽ 6.05, p ⬍ .007. Post hoc analyses of this effect revealed

Table 1
Rotation Latencies and Standard Errors (SEs) in Experiment 1
Degree of rotation
0

60

120

180

240

300

Condition

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

Aligned
Misaligned
Imagined

1.205
3.551
1.529

⫾ .054
⫾ .171
⫾ .174

3.426
5.174
2.269

⫾ .117
⫾ .260
⫾ .186

4.811
5.136
2.074

⫾ .136
⫾ .248
⫾ .197

6.548
5.329
1.871

⫾ .187
⫾ .313
⫾ .168

8.515
6.675
2.401

⫾ .254
⫾ .449
⫾ .268

9.761
6.346
2.202

⫾ .314
⫾ .379
⫾ .211

Note. All values are in seconds. The experimenter controlled response times (RTs) in the aligned and misaligned conditions; the participant controlled
RTs in the imagined condition.
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misaligned condition, RTs increased from 0° to 60° ( p ⬍ .033),
increased from 60° to 120° ( p ⬍ .048), and remained constant
across all other comparisons ( p ⬎ .05). For the imagined condition, RTs increased from 0° to 60° ( p ⬍ .0001), remained constant
between 60° and 120° and between 120° and 180° ( ps ⬎ .05),
increased from 180° to 240° ( p ⬍ .05), and decreased from 240°
to 300° ( p ⬍ .02).

Discussion

Figure 2. Mean unsigned pointing error and standard errors of Experiment 1, as a function of rotation magnitude. deg ⫽ degrees.

significant differences between aligned and misaligned conditions,
t(18) ⫽ ⫺2.96, p ⬍ .008, and between aligned and imagined
conditions, t(18) ⫽ ⫺2.84, p ⬍ .011, but no difference between
misaligned and imagined conditions, p ⬎ .05. We also found a
main effect of rotation magnitude, F(5, 65) ⫽ 4.26, p ⬍ .002, and
a significant Condition ⫻ Rotation Magnitude interaction, F(10,
130) ⫽ 1.98, p ⬍ .040. Linear contrasts performed on the separate
degree trials for each condition yielded the following patterns. For
the aligned condition, RTs increased from 0° to 60° ( p ⬍ .006) and
remained constant between all other comparisons ( ps ⬎ .05). For
the misaligned condition, RTs remained constant across all comparisons ( ps ⬎ .05). For the imagined condition, RTs increased
from 0° to 60° ( p ⬍ .021); remained constant between 60° and
120°, 120° and 180°, and 180° and 240° ( ps ⬎ .05); and decreased
from 240° to 300° ( p ⬍ .013). The Order ⫻ Task ⫻ Rotation
Magnitude interaction was also significant, F(50, 130) ⫽ 1.50, p ⬍
.037.

As predicted, participants were faster and more accurate at
locating objects with a pointer when they were physically turned to
new perspectives in an array (aligned condition) compared with
when they merely imagined turning to them (imagined condition)
or when they had to ignore movement to an incorrect perspective
(misaligned condition). In contrast, no difference in performance
was found between the imagined and misaligned conditions. These
results are in agreement with those of Farrell and Robertson (1998)
and thus lend credence to the novel spatial-updating task that we
used. However, some of Farrell and Robertson’s findings did not
replicate. For one, they found that pointing errors increased with
larger rotation magnitudes in their updating (physical-movement)
condition. Although errors in the present experiment showed an
effect of degree over all conditions, the function for aligned errors
was relatively flat. This is most likely because participants in the
present experiment were given the location of their new heading
(i.e., the Gumby color) at the onset of each trial, whereas participants in Farrell and Robertson’s study were not. As those authors
have previously noted, participants might use advance information
of heading to correct any errors that may have accumulated during
movement. Other updating experiments in which participants were
given heading information at the onset of self-rotation have
yielded a flat error function similar to that of the present study
(Rieser, 1989).
We also failed to replicate Farrell and Robertson’s (1998) automaticity effects. In their study, a clear dissocation was found
between RT patterns for physical movement and those of imagined
movement and ignored movement, with the former being less

Location RT
Figure 3 shows mean response times and standard errors for
each movement condition as a function of rotation magnitude.
Consistent with the error patterns, updating performance was faster
in the aligned condition (M ⫽ 3.96 s) than in the misaligned (M
⫽ 5.10 s) and imagined (M ⫽ 4.72 s) conditions. The ANOVA
performed on mean scores yielded a main effect of condition, F(2,
26) ⫽ 19.99, p ⬍ .0001. Post hoc analyses of this effect yielded
significant differences between aligned and misaligned conditions,
t(18) ⫽ ⫺3.35, p ⫽ .004, and between aligned and imagined
conditions, t(18) ⫽ ⫺3.33, p ⫽ .004, but no difference between the
misaligned and imagined conditions ( p ⬎ .05). We also found a
main effect of rotation magnitude, F(5, 65) ⫽ 6.72, p ⬍ .0001, and
a significant Condition ⫻ Rotation Magnitude interaction, F(10,
130) ⫽ 5.65, p ⬍ .0001. Linear contrasts performed on the
separate degree trials for each condition yielded the following
patterns. For the aligned condition, RTs increased from 0° to 60°
( p ⬍ .001), increased from 60° to 120° ( p ⬍ .021), decreased from
120° to 180° ( p ⫽ .003), increased from 180° to 240° ( p ⬎ .05),
and remained constant between 240° and 300° ( p ⬎ .05). For the

Figure 3. Mean response times (RTs) and standard errors of Experiment 1, as a function of rotation magnitude. sec ⫽ seconds.
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influenced by rotation magnitude than the latter two. In the present
study, RTs generally increased to 120° and peaked at 120° and
240°. Moreover, we found this pattern most strongly in the aligned
condition and to lesser degrees in the misaligned and imagined
conditions. This finding is striking for two reasons. First, it contradicts the notion that updating during physical movement occurs
automatically. Second, it suggests that differences in updating
automaticity across movement conditions are not as clear-cut as
previously thought.
There are several possible explanations for why Farrell and
Robertson’s (1998) automaticity effects did not replicate. In their
study, they used only a subset of the total possible updating trials,
repeated twice for a total of 16 trials. In the present study, we
tested 30 trials, none of which were repeats. One possibility is that
increased cognitive demands required to process a broader range
of new trials in the present study diminished automaticity effects.
This interpretation would imply that automatic updating is the
result of practice; however, other studies using single-trial presentations have found automaticity effects (Wraga et al., 2000; Wraga,
Creem-Regehr, and Proffitt, 2002). A more likely explanation is
that the technique we used of separating the spatial-updating event
into rotation and location components put all of the movement
conditions on more equal footing. This technique thus allowed a
more accurate assessment of differences in performance among
aligned, misaligned, and imagined conditions.
Although the general RT function we found across movement
conditions is not in accord with Farrell and Robertson’s (1998)
results, there is some precedent for it. Wraga, Creem-Regehr, &
Proffitt (2002) also found that pointing RTs in a self-rotation task
were greater for rotation magnitudes that were offset from the
intrinsic axes of the human body. In the present experiment, RTs
generally peaked at magnitudes of 120° and 240°—angles that are
oblique to the major axes of the body and whose locations appear
behind the observer and thus out of sight. These results are in line
with Franklin and Tversky’s (1990) spatial-framework model of
space conceptualization, which posits that mental representations
of space reflect the constraints of the physical body.
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Method
Participants
Nineteen Harvard University undergraduate students (9 women and 10
men) volunteered to participate in the experiment. All were right-handed.
They were compensated $10 for their time. None of the participants knew
of the hypothesis being tested.

Materials
The materials were identical to Experiment 1, except that no pointer was
used.

Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that participants did
not undergo a pointer training session. Before performing the aligned,
imagined, and misaligned conditions, participants first learned the locations of the array with respect to six verbal labels (front, back, right–front,
right– back, left–front, left– back). They were then tested on their memory
for the color configurations. Similar to Experiment 1, participants closed
their eyes, and the experimenter then tested for the color locations by
calling them out in a random order. Participants received verbal feedback
on responses that were incorrect. Criteria for learning the array were met
when participants could locate all colors of the array correctly within 1 s.
Instructions for the rotation and location components of the array were
identical to those of Experiment 1, except that in the latter, participants
simply responded with the verbal label corresponding to the correct location of the second color. They were instructed to respond as quickly and as
accurately as possible for all test trials.

Design
The design was identical to Experiment 1.

Analysis
The analysis was identical to Experiment 1, except that only trimmed
RTs and mean errors were included.

Results
Experiment 2
The previous experiment established an advantage for spatial
updating during physical self-rotation versus imagined selfrotation. Experiment 2 examined whether the reverse effect could
occur. We used the same updating task in identical movement
conditions as in Experiment 1, with one important exception:
Participants in Experiment 2 indicated object locations verbally
rather than by pointing to them. de Vega and Rodrigo (2001) found
that merely changing the response measure in a spatial-updating
task from pointing to verbal labeling resulted in improved performance during imagined self-rotation. We anticipated a similar
result. Similar to Experiment 1, participants updated object locations in an array during aligned-, misaligned-, and imaginedmovement conditions. On the basis of the results of de Vega and
Rodrigo and on other studies showing excellent updating performance for imagined self-rotations using the verbal modality (e.g.,
Wraga et al., 2000; Wraga, Creem-Regehr, and Proffitt, 2002), we
predicted that updating performance would be superior in the
imagined condition compared with aligned and misaligned
conditions.

Rotation RT
Table 2 shows mean RTs and standard errors for rotation in the
aligned-, misaligned-, and imagined-movement conditions. Because rotation was not equivalent across the three movement
conditions, parametric tests were not performed on the data.

Location RT
Figure 4 shows mean response times and standard errors for
each movement condition as a function of rotation magnitude. The
principal finding was that participants were faster at updating in
the imagined condition (M ⫽ 2.27 s) than in the aligned (M ⫽ 2.59
s) and misaligned (M ⫽ 2.81 s) conditions. The ANOVA performed on mean scores yielded a main effect of condition
F(2,26) ⫽ 4.97, p ⬍ .015. Post hoc analyses of this effect yielded
significant differences between imagined and aligned conditions,
t(18) ⫽ ⫺2.29, p ⫽ .034, and imagined and misaligned conditions,
t(18) ⫽ ⫺5.86, p ⫽ .0001, but no difference between the aligned
and misaligned conditions ( p ⫽ .178). We also found a main effect
of rotation magnitude, F(5, 65) ⫽ 6.45, p ⬍ .0001, and a signif-
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Table 2
Rotation Latencies and Standard Errors (SEs) in Experiment 2

Degree of rotation
0

60

120

180

240

300

Condition

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

Aligned
Misaligned
Imagined

0.951
4.032
1.331

⫾ .054
⫾ .176
⫾ .097

3.169
5.540
2.217

⫾ .120
⫾ .218
⫾ .250

4.659
5.247
2.343

⫾ .169
⫾ .154
⫾ .284

5.778
5.336
2.311

⫾ .292
⫾ .213
⫾ .294

6.909
6.751
2.547

⫾ .404
⫾ .298
⫾ .355

7.842
6.275
2.295

⫾ .460
⫾ .244
⫾ .347

Note. All values are in seconds. The experimenter controlled response times (RTs) in the aligned and misaligned conditions; the participant controlled
RTs in the imagined condition.

icant Condition ⫻ Rotation Magnitude interaction, F(10,
130) ⫽ 3.58, p ⬍ .0001. Linear contrasts performed for each
degree condition yielded the following patterns. For the aligned
condition, RTs remained constant between 0° and 60°, between
60° and 120°, between 120° and 180°, and between 180° and 240°
( ps ⬎ .05); however, RTs decreased from 240° to 300° ( p ⬍ .018).
For the misaligned condition, RTs increased from 0° to 60° ( p ⬍
.009) and remained constant for all other comparisons ( ps ⬎ .05).
For the imagined condition, RTs increased from 0° to 60° ( p ⬍
.041), increased from 60° to 120° ( p ⬍ .043), and remained
constant for all other comparisons ( ps ⬎ .05).

Discussion

Figure 5 shows mean errors and standard errors for each condition as a function of rotation magnitude. Participants’ responses
were highly accurate in all tasks (aligned: M ⫽ 0.13 error; misaligned: M ⫽ 0.12 error; imagined: M ⫽ 0.09 error). The ANOVA
performed on mean error scores produced a main effect of rotation
magnitude only, F(5, 65) ⫽ 4.81, p ⬍ .001. Linear contrasts
revealed that errors increased from 0° to 60° ( p ⬍ .031), remained
constant between 60° and 120° ( p ⬎ .05), decreased from 120° to
180° ( p ⬍ .0001), increased from 180° to 240° ( p ⬍ .043), and
remained constant between 240° and 300° ( p ⬎ .05).

By simply changing the response measure from pointing to
verbal labeling, we found spatial updating to be superior during
imagined self-rotation, despite the absence of sensorimotor information specifying self-movement in that condition. Participants
were faster at locating colors in the imagined condition than in the
aligned and misaligned conditions. Nor was there a decrement in
accuracy in the imagined condition compared with the aligned and
misaligned conditions. These findings surpass those of de Vega
and Rodrigo (2001), who found comparable updating performance
during imagined and physical self-rotation for a task in which
participants used verbal labels to update objects in a spatial configuration. In that study, participants initially constructed the spatial configuration from a verbal description of a scene. The results
of the present study demonstrate that updating during imagined
self-rotation can be advantageous even in situations in which
spatial configurations are encoded from perceptual information.
In addition to the imagined-self-rotation updating advantage, the
results of the present study differ from Farrell and Robertson’s
(1998) in several important ways. Within the verbal modality, we
continued to see inconsistent automaticity effects across movement conditions. RTs increased with rotation magnitude in an
overall pattern of results similar to that of Experiment 1. RTs

Figure 4. Mean response times (RTs) and standard errors of Experiment 2, as a function of rotation magnitude. sec ⫽ seconds.

Figure 5. Mean errors (out of a possible 30) and standard errors of
Experiment 2, as a function of rotation magnitude.

Location Accuracy
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increased to the oblique axis of 120°, although this time they
remained constant to 240°, showing greater automaticity. However, the effect differed somewhat across individual movement
conditions in ways that are difficult to interpret. For example, we
found a strong automaticity effect in the misaligned condition,
where RTs remained constant beyond the 0° rotation. This finding
is in contrast to previous assertions that conditions in which
sensorimotor information must be ignored require processing akin
to mental rotation (Farrell & Robertson, 1998). More evidence
against the mental-rotation assertion is found in comparing updating performance between aligned and misaligned conditions. As
assessed by both RT and accuracy, performance in these conditions was virtually identical. If updating in the misaligned condition requires mental rotation, one would be forced to argue for
similar processing in the aligned condition. A more likely explanation is that performance in these conditions was equally affected
by some other cognitive process. In debriefing, most participants
claimed that they found movement in both aligned and misaligned
conditions to be distracting, in the sense that it focused attention
away from where they were trying to move mentally. Thus, the
physical movement in these conditions may have created a type of
interference effect. This issue warrants further empirical
investigation.
Although the imagined-self-rotation updating advantage we
found using a verbal-response measure is in line with our
reference-frame-conflict hypothesis, it could also be explained
using de Vega and Rodrigo’s (2001) proposal that spatial updating
is subserved by separate spatial- and language-processing mechanisms. A more direct test of the reference-frame-conflict hypothesis would show an imagined-self-rotation updating advantage
using a response measure that was not verbal. We attempted this in
Experiment 3.

Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we investigated whether the updating advantage found with imagined self-movement in the previous experiment would hold up in a task that did not require verbal responses.
According to our hypothesis, the critical factor to enhanced spatialupdating performance during imagined self-rotation is a response
measure that does not anchor the observer to the coordinate system
of the physical body. In Experiment 3 participants updated object
locations by pressing arrow keys on a computer keyboard. The
arrows were positioned in such a way that they were deliberately
offset from the reference frame of the participant’s body (see
Figure 6). This created a counterintuitive arrangement that required some training to master. Nevertheless, we expected that this
manipulation would allow participants to better ignore the reference frame of the physical body. As a consequence of the task
difficulty, participants performed in the aligned- and imaginedmovement conditions only. We predicted that updating performance would be superior in the imagined condition compared with
the aligned condition.

Method
Participants
Sixteen Harvard University undergraduate students (8 women and 8
men) volunteered to participate in the experiment. All were right-handed.
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Figure 6. A contrast of pointing response schematics. A: A traditional
pointing response, in which the arrows are aligned with the observer’s
egocentric frame. B: The set of arrows used in Experiment 3, which were
offset from the observer’s egocentric frame.

They were compensated $10 for their time. The data of 2 additional
participants were eliminated from analysis for having more than 50%
errors (1 in the aligned condition; 1 in the imagined condition). None of the
participants knew of the hypothesis being tested.

Materials
The array was identical to that used in Experiment 1. We affixed a
MacIntosh G3 laptop computer to a 35 cm ⫻ 61 cm ⫻ 1 cm wooden board,
painted white. The board fit over the arms of the swivel chair. A 9.5
cm ⫻ 27 cm piece of foam core with a 3.5 cm ⫻ 6 cm opening was affixed
over the computer keyboard in such a way that only the U, I, O and J, K,
L keys were exposed. Onto these keys we placed round yellow stickers (1.3
cm diameter) containing directional arrows varying in orientation from 0°
to 300° in 60° increments (see Figure 6B). An additional 2 ⫻ 10 cm cutout
in the foam core over the spacebar permitted access to that key.

Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that participants
went through a computer-training phase rather than a pointer-training
phase. The experimenter placed the computer on the arms of the participant’s chair and showed the participant how to rest his or her dominant
hand on the keyboard. Participants were told that they would be using the
arrow keys to locate objects in the array. They were given time to practice
pressing the keys with their eyes open to become acclimated with the
directional sequence. They then closed their eyes, and the experimenter ran
a practice script on the computer. The script was a random sequence of the
directional keys programmed to produce auditory feedback if an incorrect
key was pressed. The experimenter followed a paper copy of the same
sequence while tapping on the stands. The participants used the keys to
“point” to the correct position in the array. They received auditory feed-
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back from the computer for incorrect responses. The criteria for learning
were met if participants could locate all positions correctly within 1 s. If
participants had not met these criteria by the end of the script, the experimenter ran it again. Participants usually learned the key positions in
about 5 min. The experimenter then placed the colors for a given array
configuration on the stands, and participants were tested for location of the
colors. Participants closed their eyes, and the experimenter ran a script on
the computer that presented the colors auditorially, one at a time in a
random order. Participants pressed the arrow keys corresponding to the
correct color locations. Criteria for learning the array were met when
participants could correctly locate all colors consecutively within 1 s.
Instructions for the rotation and location components of the task were
identical to those of Experiment 1, except that in the location component,
participants responded by pressing the key corresponding to the correct
location of the second color. They were instructed to respond as quickly
and as accurately as possible for all test trials.

Design
Participants performed in both movement conditions (imagined and
aligned). Two of the three array configurations from Experiment 1 were
used. Order of condition and array were counterbalanced across
participants.

Figure 7. Mean response times (RTs) and standard errors of Experiment 3, as a function of rotation magnitude. sec ⫽ seconds.

for each condition yielded the following patterns. For the aligned
condition, RTs remained constant between 0° and 60°, between
60° and 120°, and between 120° and 180° ( ps ⬎ .05); increased
from 180° to 240° ( p ⬍ .002); and decreased from 240° to 300° ( p
⬍ .002). For the imagined condition, RTs remained constant
between 0° and 60° ( p ⬎ .05), increased from 60° to 120° ( p ⬍
.039), remained constant between 120° and 180° and between 180°
and 240° ( ps ⬎ .05), and decreased from 240° to 300° ( p ⬍
.0001).

Statistical Analysis
We used the same statistical analysis from Experiment 1, except that
only trimmed RTs and mean errors were used.

Results
Rotation RT
Table 3 shows mean RTs and standard errors for rotation in the
aligned and imagined conditions. Because rotation was not equivalent across the two movement conditions, parametric tests were
not performed on the data.

Location Accuracy
Figure 8 shows mean errors and standard errors for each condition as a function of rotation magnitude. Participants’ responses
were very accurate in both movement conditions (aligned:
M ⫽ 0.22 err; imagined: M ⫽ 0.30 err). The ANOVA performed
on mean error scores produced a main effect of rotation magnitude
only, F(5, 70) ⫽ 9.87, p ⬍ .0001. Linear contrasts revealed that
errors remained constant between 0° and 60°, 60° and 120°, and
120° and 180° ( ps ⬎ .05); increased from 180° to 240° ( p ⬍ .005);
and decreased between 240° and 300° ( p ⬍ .0001).

Location RT
Figure 7 shows mean response times and standard errors for
both tasks as a function of rotation magnitude. The principal
finding was that participants were faster at updating in the imagined condition (M ⫽ 2.40 s) than they were in the aligned condition (M ⫽ 3.22 s). The ANOVA performed on mean scores yielded
main effects of condition, F(1, 14) ⫽ 10.67, p ⬍ .006, and rotation
magnitude, F(5, 70) ⫽ 11.22, p ⬍ .0001, as well as a significant
Condition ⫻ Rotation Magnitude interaction, F(5, 70) ⫽ 2.54, p ⬍
.036. Linear contrasts performed on the rotation magnitude effect

Discussion
Performance was faster in the imagined condition compared
with the aligned condition, and we found no difference in accuracy

Table 3
Rotation Latencies and Standard Errors (SEs) in Experiment 3
Degree of rotation
0

60

120

180

240

300

Condition

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

Aligned
Imagined

1.675
1.194

⫾ .709
⫾ .135

3.656
2.548

⫾ .214
⫾ .596

6.227
3.109

⫾ .506
⫾ .589

7.459
3.286

⫾ .314
⫾ .727

10.039
2.580

⫾ .534
⫾ .457

11.277
2.802

⫾ .662
⫾ .539

Note. All values are in seconds. The experimenter controlled response times (RTs) in the aligned condition; the participant controlled RTs in the imagined
condition.
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Figure 8. Mean errors (out of a possible 30) and standard errors of
Experiment 3, as a function of rotation magnitude.

across conditions. Thus, a spatial-updating advantage for imagined
self-rotations persisted for a situation in which participants used a
response measure that did not involve verbal encoding. Instead,
they located objects in the array by “pointing” with arrow keys that
were offset from the coordinate system of the physical body. This
finding supports the reference-frame-conflict hypothesis. An advantage for spatial updating during imagined self-rotation emerged
when we used a response measure that reduced the conflict between the participant’s physical and projected egocentric reference
frames.
Within the offset keyboard response modality, we continued to
find a weak automaticity effect. RTs in the imagined condition
peaked at rotations of 120° and 240°; RTs in the aligned condition
were flatter but peaked for 240° rotation trials. When compared
with the values of Experiment 2, RTs for the 240° condition in
Experiment 3 were markedly longer. We have no clear explanation
for this difference, although the fact that it occurs for both imagined and aligned conditions suggests an individual difference
effect. This finding warrants further empirical investigation.

General Discussion
These studies examined the effect of different response measures on spatial updating during physical and imagined-selfrotation conditions. In Experiment 1 participants used a pointer to
locate unseen objects from novel perspectives within an array.
Movement to the novel perspectives occurred by physical rotation
to a correct perspective (aligned condition), physical rotation to an
incorrect perspective in which sensorimotor information was ignored (misaligned condition), or imagined rotation to a correct
perspective (imagined condition). Using the pointing modality,
participants’ updating performance was superior in the aligned
condition compared with the misaligned and imagined conditions.
In Experiment 2 participants performed the same updating task in
identical movement conditions but located objects in the array by
using a verbal response rather than by pointing. Performance was
found to be superior in the imagined condition compared with the
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aligned and misaligned conditions. In Experiment 3 we tested
updating performance using a variation of a pointing task in which
the location indicators were offset from the coordinate system of
the participant’s physical body. Updating was again found to be
superior during the imagined-self-rotation condition compared
with the physical-self-rotation condition.
In the past, researchers have proposed a differentiation of the
mechanism underlying spatial updating based on either automatic
versus cognitively effortful processing (e.g., Farrell & Robertson,
1998; Rieser, 1989) or spatial versus verbal processing (de Vega &
Rodrigo, 2001). The results of the present study suggest that
neither of these proposals is quite accurate. We found that updating
performance during imagined self-rotation, a task requiring cognitive effort, could actually surpass that of physical self-rotation,
despite the absence of sensorimotor information that presumably
enhances the updating process (Farrell & Robertson, 1998; Rieser,
1989). Nor was the imagined-self-rotation advantage due to an
increase in automaticity within that movement condition, as indicated by the RT functions of Experiment 2. The updating advantage occurred when we changed the response modality from pointing to verbal labeling, a context that is arguably more cognitive.
With regard to dissociations of spatial versus verbal processing,
Experiment 3 demonstrated that the imagined-self-rotation updating advantage was not limited to the verbal modality per se.
Performance was also superior during imagined self-rotation when
we used a pointing task in which the spatial indicators were offset
from the reference frame of the participant’s body. These results
suggest that the critical factor to superior updating performance is
a context in which the observer is not unnaturally anchored to the
coordinate system of the physical body. Verbal responses and
offset pointing responses meet this criterion; traditional pointing
responses do not. The corollary to this argument is that the former
modalities—in which the conflict between physical and projected
reference frames is reduced—reflect the most natural, advantageous state for spatial updating. In recent years a trend in spatialcognition research has been to focus on perceptual contributions to
the spatial-updating mechanism (e.g., Farrell & Robertson, 1998;
Klatzky et al., 1998; Rieser, 1989). On the basis of the present
findings, we are arguing for greater emphasis on contributions of
cognitive processing in its own right to the spatial-updating mechanism (see Wraga et al., 2000, for similar comments).
There is some support for this idea in the neuroimaging literature when one contrasts neural activation found in motor-imagery
tasks with that of tasks involving imagined-whole-body transformations. Studies of motor-imagery tasks, in which participants
imagine performing an action, generally have found neural activation in motor areas such as premotor cortex, primary motor
cortex (M1), or both (e.g., Decety et al., 1994; Ganis, Keenan,
Kosslyn, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998; Kosslyn, Thompson, Wraga, & Alpert, 2001;
Parsons et al., 1995). For example, Kosslyn et al. (1998) had
participants view pairs of hands, one of which appeared at a
different orientation with respect to the other. Their task was to
decide whether the hand pairs were identical or mirror images.
Kosslyn et al. found M1 activation during this task, despite the fact
that participants had performed no physical movement. Evidently
participants had imagined rotating their own hands into the depicted stimuli in order to solve the task, and such imagined
movements elicited activation similar to that of physical move-
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ment. Interestingly, recent neuroimaging studies of imagined selfrotation have not yielded similar motor activation, despite the fact
that participants imagine performing a rotation of the body
(Creem, Hirsch Downs, et al., 2001; Wraga, Inati, Church, Shephard, & Kosslyn, 2002). Creem, Hirsch Downs, et al. (2001) found
activation in supplementary motor areas but not M1 for a task in
which participants updated an array during imagined self-rotation.
Wraga, Inati, et al. (2002) found a similar result when activation
for an imagined-self-rotation task was directly compared with that
of an imagined-object-rotation task. These researchers have argued
that imagined-whole-body transformations may not adhere to
physical motor constraints in the same manner as mental transformations of individual body parts. More important to the present
study, these findings suggest that the mechanism underlying spatial updating during imagined self-rotation is one in which the role
of the physical body is minimized.
By highlighting the role of cognitive processing in spatial updating, we do not mean to imply that constraints of the physical
world are completely absent. Indeed, the findings of the present
study and others, showing greater RTs for object locations offset
from the orthogonal axes of the egocentric reference frame, indicate that some aspects of the physical body factor into spatial
representations (Wraga et al., 2000; Wraga, Creem-Regehr, &
Proffitt, 2002; see also Creem, Wraga, & Proffitt, 2001, for evidence of other physical constraints). The challenge for spatialcognition researchers is to provide a full and accurate characterization of the mechanisms underlying spatial updating, using both
behavioral and neuroimaging techniques.
A final issue raised by our findings is the practicality of using
singular measures to assess automaticity effects in spatial updating. Farrell and Robertson (1998) cited similarities in performance
rates and RT functions found in their imagined and ignored conditions as evidence of participants’ reliance on comparable cognitive processes. In particular, it was thought that participants in
these conditions had used cognitively effortful processes akin to
mental rotation. In contrast, the superior performance and flatter
RT function found in their updating condition was interpreted as
evidence for automatic updating. However, we found that the issue
became more complex in the present study with the use of multiple
response measures. Performance similarities varied among
aligned-, misaligned-, and imagined-movement conditions depending on which response modality we used. In Experiment 1 in
which participants updated locations by pointing, performance in
the aligned condition was differentiated from that of imagined and
misaligned conditions, the latter of which were nearly identical.
However, within the verbal modality of Experiment 2, performance in the imagined condition became differentiated, and
aligned and misaligned conditions were most similar. The precarious nature of these findings with respect to the automaticity issue
makes a strong case for the use of multiple measures in future
research.
In summary, the present research reveals an advantage for
spatial updating during imagined self-rotation when measures
other than traditional pointing responses are used. The critical
factor to enhanced updating performance appears to be a context in
which the spatial conflict between the reference frame of the
physical body and the projected egocentric frame is minimized.
These findings suggest that cognitive aspects of the spatial-

updating mechanism may play a more critical role than has previously been thought.
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